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THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT-
PLACEBO OR PANACEA?
"A child has to experience some minor injuries, some minor exper-
iences of trauma in order to learn." Richard J. Manuell, Child
Safety Consultant, National Safety Council.'
An infant squirms between the slats of his crib. His body easily
slides through, but his skull does not. He strangles to death.2 A
man is suddenly shocked from his power saw, and tries to insulate
himself by standing on a stack of wood. Nonetheless, another shock
grips him. As his wife cuts the power, he drops the saw and the
blade slashes his thigh. A little girl gets up in the middle of the
night, trips over the cord of the "spill-proof" steam vaporizer,
1. Testimony before the National Commission on Product Safety, De-
cember 17, 1968, cited in NATIONAL COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY, FINAL
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGREss 30 (1970) (NCPS).
2. NCPS at 23.
One model of crib was the cause of two infant strangulations within a
three week period in 1965. In 1968, the same model crib was still being
marketed without change in design, and without warning of the particular
hazard. Ironically, the manufacturer, Trimble Products Inc., has as its
motto: "Since 1912, your baby's health and comfort, our only business."
Id.
If the reader is unaware of the enormity of the problem of consumer
safety, and of the vital need for some sort of affirmative action in this
area, he would read chapter 2 of NCPS. It should be noted that the Final
Report is not universally accepted. One critic, who read all the hearing
testimony, reached a totally opposite conclusion than did the National
Commission on Product Safety. His criticisms, briefly, are (1) that the
testimony revealed no "solid" evidence to support the conclusionary re-
sults painted in the Final Report because of the non-meaningfulness of the
statistics; (2) that the Commissioners premised their conclusions on the
sentimental, but economically unsound proposition that "even one injury
is too many"; (3) that the inevitable result of federally imposed require-
ments that products be made safe will be "gray products" which con-
sumers will not buy, thus dampening the economy; (4) that the Commis-
sioners assumed that the public was too ignorant to make the "cost-benefit"
trade-offs regarding consumer products, i.e., he is incompetent to make his
own safety decisions; (5) that new monopolistic-related abuses will result
because only a few lucky producers would be able to operate within the
system; and (6) that the make-up of the National Commission on Product
Safety was so loaded with consumer product safety advocates as to de-
stroy any chance of objectivity in its findings. See Henderson, Book Re-
view, 51 BosTon U.L. REv. 704 (1971).
3. The shock was produced by a short circuit between brush retainers
pressed into contact with the commutator, the consequences of a faulty de-
sign. Id. at 26.
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and is drenched by scalding water from the reservoir of the vapor-
izer. She is burned over 30% of her body, requires hospitaliza-
tion of some six months and faces the prospect of six to twelve
operations. 4 These are not examples of isolated incidents. Some
twenty million injuries-110,000 permanent-and thirty thousand
deaths are annually attributed to incidents involving consumer
products.5 Of course, unreasonably hazardous products do not
cause all of these injuries, but the sheer weight of these statistics,
coupled with an estimated five and a half billion dollar annual cost
to the nation from product related injuries,6 convinced Congress that
action at the federal level was necessary to reduce the risk to the
consumer. The solution offered is the Consumer Product Safety
Act1 (the Act).
PART I-THE ACT IN CONTEXT
A. Synopsis of the Act
The Act purports to protect the public against unreasonable risks
of injury associated with consumer products, to assist consumers
in evaluating the comparative safety of consumer products, to mini-
mize conflicting state and local regulations, and to promote re-
search and investigation into the causes and prevention of prod-
uct-related deaths, illnesses, and injuries.8 To achieve these ends,
4. McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 332, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967).
The outside of the reservoir registered 182 ° after six hours of operation-
water of 1450 will burn, water of 180" will cause third degree burns on a
five-year old.
5. NCPS at 1.
6. Id.
7. Pub. L. No. 92-573 (Oct. 27, 1972).
8. Sec. 2(b). The purposes of the Act are intended to ameliorate the
problem, which Congress found to be that:
(1) an unacceptable number of consumer products which present
unreasonable risks of injury are distributed in commerce;
(2) complexities of consumer products and the diverse nature
and abilities of consumers using them frequently result in an in-
ability of users to anticipate risks and to safeguard themselves
adequately;
(3) the public should be protected against unreasonable risks of
injury associated with consumer products;
(4) control by State and local governments of unreasonable risks
of injury associated with consumer products is inadequate and
may be burdensome to manufacturers;(5) existing Federal authority to protect consumers from ex-
posure to consumer products presenting unreasonable risks of in-
jury is inadequate; and(6) regulation of consumer products, the distribution or use of
the Act establishes an independent five-member Consumer Product
Safety Commission 9 (the Commission) together with a 15-member
Product Safety Advisory Council.'0 Also established is the Injury
Information Clearinghouse," intended to serve as a collating head-
quarters for information relating to injuries associated with con-
sumer products. The clearinghouse is to disburse this informa-
tion to the Commission for standard setting purposes, or to the man-
ufacturer'2 so that he may take corrective measures without Com-
mission intervention.
Within the parameters of the definition of consumer product,'8
set forth at Appendix I, infra, the Commission is empowered to
promulgate safety standards which will be mainly relative to the
performance, design, or construction of the product, or to warn-
ings accompanying the product.' 4 A proceeding to establish a con-
sumer product safety standard will be commenced upon the Com-
mission's own motion,' 5 or upon receiving a proposal from the Ad-
visory Council,16 or upon the granting, voluntarily'17 or by court
order' s of a private petition. The petition may be that of a con-
sumer or manufacturer.
The proceedings for establishing the standard begin with the
publication of a notice in the Federal Register identifying the prod-
uct and the associated risk, and inviting any person to submit a
standard or an offer to develop a standard within 30 days of the
publication of the notice.' 9 The Commission may accept one or
which affects interstate or foreign commerce is necessary to carry
out this Act. Sec. 2 (a).
9. Sec. 4(a). To date only 4 Commissioners have been nominated:
Richard 0. Simpson, an acting assistant secretary of commerce, Lawrence
M. Kushner, acting director of the National Bureau of Standards, Con-
stance E. Newman, director of Vista; and Barbara Hackman Franklin,
White House staff assistant for executive manpower. The President has
indicated that the fifth nominee will be named soon. San Diego Union,
April 5, 1973, at 1, col. 3.
10. Sec. 28. The council shall be made up of five members each from
governmental agencies, consumer products industries, and consumer or
community organizations.
11. Sec. 5(a).
12. Unless otherwise noted, "manufacturer" will serve as a shorthand
notation for '"manufacturer, distributor, retailer, or private labeler" since
people in all of these categories can be held liable criminally, civilly, or
privately, under the Act.
13. "Consumer product" includes imported products, but not products
intended solely for export. See Sec. 17, 18.




18. See text accompanying notes 30-32 infra.
19. Sec. 7(b). This section is unique with respect to other Federal
safety regulations, in that the invitation to develop a standard is extended
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more of these offers20 and may contribute to the costs of developing
the standard.21 If the Commission receives no offers, or declines to
accept any offers or if the only offer which is accepted is by the
manufacturer of the product to be regulated, or if an existing
standard is sufficient, the Commission may independently de-
velop a standard.22 In any case, except where good cause is shown,
the Commission must either withdraw the notice of its standard
setting procedure or publish the safety rule or the declaration that
a product is a banned hazardous product not more than 210 days
after the first notice was published.23 If the Commission finds that
no feasible safety standard exists which would adequately protect
the public, then it may promulgate a rule declaring the product
a "banned hazardous product. '2 4
Before a safety rule based on such a standard can be created, or
an unreasonably hazardous and unremedial product banned, the
Commission must first find one of the following: (1) that the rule
is reasonably necessary to eliminate or reduce an unreasonable risk
of injury associated with such a product, (2) that the establish-
ment of the rule is in the public interest or, (3) in the case of a
banned product, that no feasable safety standard exists. 25 The ef-
fective date of each rule shall be at least 30 days but not more than
180 days from the date the rule is enacted, unless it is in the pub-
lic interest to shorten or lengthen the allowed time.26 The effec-
tive date must relate to the particular hazard, that is, the Com-
mission must find that a given effective date is reasonably neces-
sary to eliminate or reduce the risk of injury. 7 The production of
goods at a significantly greater rate between the date of enactment
and the effective date of a rule with a view toward circumvent-
to manufacturers and consumers alike. See 118 CONG. !Ec. H8571-82
(daily ed. Sept. 20, 1972) (remarks of Rep. Broyhill).
20. Sec. 7(d) (1).
21. Sec. 7(d) (2).
22. Sec. 7(e) (1), (2), Sec. 7(c).
23. Sec. 7(f).
24. Sec. 8.
25. Sec. 9(c) (2).
Regarding Sec. 8, banning hazardous goods for which there is no feasi-
ble safety standard, Congress has declared that the Commission need not
attempt to develop a standard under Sec. 7, but may directly proceed to




ing the rule, called stockpiling, is prohibited.28
As previously mentioned, any interested person may petition
the Commission to initiate proceedings to issue, amend or revoke a
safety rule. This petition must be granted or denied within 120
days of filing.29 If the petition is granted, a proceeding to develop
a standard, or to declare a product banned, is commenced; there is
no automatic drafting of a standard. If the petition be denied, or
if the Commission does not answer within 120 days, the petitioner
may bring an action in the District Court to compel the Commission
to take the requested action.3 0 To prevail, the petitioner must show
by a preponderance of evidence that the product presents an un-
reasonable risk of injury and that failure to initiate the rule-mak-
ing proceeding exposes consumers to a risk of injury.8' If the con-
sumer meets this burden, the remedy is an order by the court that
the Commission should commence a standard setting proceeding, not
a requirement that a rule should be formulated.32
Once a rule is established, a person adversely affected may ap-
peal such a ruling in a District Court by filing not later than 60 days
after the promulgation of the rule.8 3 The rule will be overturned
28. Sec. 9(d) (2).
29. Sec. 10(a), (d).
30. Sec. 10 (e) (1). The predicted efficacy of this federal injunctive relief
is discussed at p. 30-31 infra.
31. Sec. 10(e) (2).
32. Obviously this section is the Act's designed access point for con-
sumer input, although a three-year period is interposed during which time
no consumer petitions will be allowed in order to provide time for the
organization of the new agency.
The burden of proof section (Sec. 10 (e) (2)) refers to the requirements of
establishing a standard, although Sec. 10(a) provides for a petition to
withdraw a standard, a provision which probably would be brought by a
manufacturer, not a consumer. Conceivably, then, a court will be called
on to decide exactly when a risk of injury becomes reasonable. No defini-
tion is included in the Act, but the Senate Bill (S. 3419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.,§ 102(g), (h), (i) (1972) printed at 118 CONG. REC. S9932 (daily ed. June
21, 1972) ) employed a balancing test which appears rational. When the
degree and frequency of anticipated injury could be reduced without af-
fecting the performance or availability of the class of product under con-
sideration, then almost any risk of injury is unreasonable. If performance
or availability is affected, then those interests must be balanced against
the degree and frequency of foreseeable injury. The Senate's balancing
test emphasized that health and safety should take precedence over other
factors.
It was also noted in the Senate consideration of the Act that the phrase
"unreasonable risks of injury associated with consumer products" was
used to state the purpose of the Act. Sec. 2(b) (1) (emphasis added). "As-
sociated" was used because it meant that the injury did not have to re-
sult from "normal use", but could also result from foreseeable or reason-
able misuse of the product. See 118 CONG. REC. S18198-99 (daily ed. Oct.
14, 1972) (remarks of Sen. Moss).
33. Sec. 11(a).
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unless each of the findings that the Commission is required to make
under Section 9(c) is supported by "substantial evidence" on the
record taken as a whole.34
Thus, although the Commission's rule making proceeding is per-
mitted to follow the informal procedures of section 553 of Title 5 of
the U.S. Code . . . its determinations are subjected to the stricter
standard of review that is normally reserved for formal agency
proceedings .... 35
Imminently hazardous products need not be subjected to the
standard setting proceedings under the Act.3 6 The Commission may
proceed by libel for the seizure and condemnation of such a
product, and may obtain such relief as an order requiring the
manufacturer to notify known purchasers of the product of the
risk and recall, repair, replace or allow refund for the product.3 7
In appropriate cases the Commission is required to initiate a stand-
ard setting proceeding as soon as practicable to apply to the seized
product. 38
The Act imposes several affirmative duties on the manufacturer.
He must furnish notice and a description of any new consumer
product to the Commission before distributing it in commerce.8 9 If
his product be regulated by a safety standard, he must certify that
the product conforms to all applicable safety standards and must
specify any standard which is applicable.40 The manufacturer
must allow inspection of warehouses and factories and the like.41
34. Sec. 11(c).
35. House Report at 38.
36. Sec. 12 (a). Imminently dangerous is defined as presenting imminent
and unreasonable risk of death, serious illness, or severe personal injury.
37. Sec. 12(b).
38. Sec. 12(c).
39. Sec. 13 (a). This requirement is contingent upon the Commission's
prescribing procedures for such notification.
This section should not be considered earth-shaking:
[It] is designed to provide the Commission with a means of
keeping abreast of new products entering the marketplace so that
it can head off imminently hazardous products in the courts or
promptly institute a proceeding to ban or develop standards for
products which it determines are unreasonably hazardous. It is
not intended that the Commission's rulemaking powers under this
section be used to require premarket clearance of new consumer
products. House Report at 39.
40. Sec. 14(a) (1). The Commission shall require the certificate to be
based on reasonable testing programs. Also, certain products will have
certifying labels permanently attached to them, where practicable.
41. Sec. 16.
If the manufactuer acquires knowledge that the product does not
comply with an applicable safety rule, or that the product contains
a defect which would create a substantial product hazard42 he
must immediately inform the Commission.43
The Commission has several alternative methods for reducing or
eliminating the risks to the public presented by defective consum-
er products. In addition to banning the marketing of hazardous
products for which no feasible safety standard can be developed, 44
seizing imminently dangerous products" and setting standards
with which goods must comply, the Commission may require the
manufacturer to give notice of the defect to the public, to others
in the marketing chain, or to persons known to have purchased
and taken delivery of the product.46
The Commission may require the manufacturer to elect one of
the following remedial devices:
(1) To bring such product into conformity with the requirements
of the applicable consumer product safety rule or to repair the de-
fect in such product.
(2) To replace such product with a like or equivalent product
which complies with the applicable consumer product safety rule
or which does not contain the defect.
(3) To refund the purchase price of such product .... 47
In the event such remedial actions are required, no charge shall be
imposed on any person who avails himself of such a remedy. Fur-
ther, the manufacturer shall reimburse such a person for his rea-
sonable and foreseeable expenses.48 The Commission has broad au-
thority in this area to place the burden of making such reimburse-
ment on that member of the marketing chain who was either most
at fault, or who is most able to bear the cost.4 9
After defining the duties of the Commission and the manufac-
turer, the Act continues to explicate exactly what is prohibited.
No person shall market any consumer product which is not in con-
formity with an applicable consumer product safety standard, or
which has been declared a banned hazardous product.6 Also de-
42. Defined as:
a product defect which because of the pattern of the defect, the
number of defective products distributed in commerce, the sever-
ity of the risk, or otherwise) creates a substantial risk of injury to
the public. Sec. 15(a) (2).
43. Sec. 15 (b).
44. Sec. 8.
45. See text accompanying notes 36-38 supra.
46. Sec. 15 (c).
47. Sec. 15(d)(1), (2), (3).
48. Sec. 15(e) (1).
49. See House Report at 42-43.
50. Sec. 19(a) (1), (2).
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clared unlawful are the following: the failure to allow inspec-
tion,51 the failure to furnish the Commission with information re-
lating to product defects, 52 the failure to comply with an order
requiring notification, repair, replacement, or refund,58 the failure
to furnish a certificate or the issuance of a false certificate,54 or
the failure to comply with the stockpiling restrictions.55
A knowing violation of a prohibited act subjects the violator to
civil penalties not exceeding $2,000 per violation and up to $500,000
for a related series of violations.56 The violation is "knowing" if
the violator had actual knowledge, or should have had the knowl-
edge as a reasonable man under the circumstances, including
knowledge obtainable by the exercise of due care to ascertain the
truth of representations. 57  Among other things, the degree of
the knowledge of the violator bears on whether and to what ex-
tent the compromise provision58 will be employed.
The criminal penalty provision is simple: any person who know-
ingly and willfully commits a prohibited act after receiving no-
tice of non-compliance may be fined not more than $50,000 or im-
prisoned for not more than one year, or both.59 Individual repre-
sentatives of a corporation may be subject to the criminal penalties
for knowing and willful violations notwithstanding any penalties
which may have been imposed on the corporation.6"
The Act provides for the issuance of injunctions to prevent an in-
dividual from marketing a product which does not comply with an
applicable standard, and for the seizure by libel procedure and con-
demnation of products which do not conform. 6' The Act extends
the power to enforce these provisions by permitting "any inter-
ested person" to bring an action in a District Court to enforce a
consumer product safety rule, or repair, replacement, or refund or-
der, or to obtain appropriate injunctive relief. Such an action
shall be preceded by notice to the Commission, the Attorney Gen-
51. Sec. 19(a) (3).
52. Sec. 19(a) (4).
53. Sec. 19(a) (5).
54. Sec. 19(a)(6).







eral, and the alleged violator, stating the nature of the alleged vio-
lation, the relief requested, and the court in which the action will
be brought.62
Explicitly created is a federal cause of action for damages (and
reasonable attorney's fees) for anyone who sustains an injury due
to a knowing violation of a safety rule or order68-a cause of ac-
tion which "shall be in addition to and not in lieu of any other
remedies provided by common law or under Federal or State
law."64  Compliance with an applicable safety standard will not
relieve a person from liability under state law or under the com-
mon law, nor will the failure of the Commission to take any action
with respect to a consumer product be admissible in evidence in
any litigation under state statutory or common law.05
Any state standard which relates to the same consumer product
safety standard as established under the Act must be identical to
the federal standard, but the federal government or the govern-
ment of any state or political subdivision may establish more strin-
gent standards for consumer products procured for its own use.00
To round out its coverage of consumer products, the Act trans-
fers certain functions of other governmental agencies under other
legislation to the Commission. All functions of the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare under the Federal Hazardous Sub-
tances Act 67 and the Poison Prevention Packaging Act of 197008
62. See text accompanying notes 46-47 supra.
63. Sec. 24. Note here that the prevailing party will be allowed to re-
cover reasonable attorney's fees. This provision makes it likely that a
"plaintiff's bar" of private attorney's general will quickly evolve. With
this financial inducement, private persons or consumer groups will have
an added incentive to carefully scrutinize all those in the marketing chain
to insure that products measure up to safety standards. In the context of
the Securities Acts, this "plaintiff's bar" has been the primary watchdog for
violations of Rule 16 (b) (15 U.S.C. § 78 (p) (1970) ) and has generated such
a great deal of enforcement litigation that a violation of Rule 16 (b) will al-
most invariably result in liability. (Of course, a private attorney general
generates a much higher fee in 16 (b) litigation than will result in Sec. 24
violations, due to the nature of that which is regulated. It seem reason-
able, however, to think that consumer organizations will not find the fee
disparity sufficiently great to dissuade their participation in the "plain-
tiff's bar".)
64. Sec. 23. The Act, therefore, establishes concurrent, not exclusive,jurisdiction in the federal courts. See also 118 CONG. REC. S18199 (daily
ed. Oct. 14, 1972) (Remarks of Sen. Moss): "The Senate and the House...
did not mean to preclude state courts from concurrent jurisdiction in en-
forcing the Federal right ....
65. Sec. 25.
66. Sec. 26.
67. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1261 et seq. (1972 Supp.).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 1471 et seq. (1970).
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and all functions of the Secretary of Health, Education and Wel-
fare, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Federal Trade Commission
under the Flammable Fabrics Act 69 are transferred to the Commis-
sion, along with certain functions of the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare under section 7 of the Poison Prevention
Packaging Act of 1970.70 If a hazard which is associated with a con-
sumer product could be eliminated or reduced by action taken un-
der the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, the Poison Prevention
Packaging Act of 1970, or the Flammable Fabrics Act, then the haz-
ardous product may be regulated only in accordance with those
acts.71 Implicit in this statement is the idea that if the hazard can-
not be reduced under the procedures of the other acts, then the
provisions of this Act may be employed to reduce the hazard.
Specifically deleted from the scope of the Act are hazards asso-
ciated with consumer products which could be prevented or re-
duced to a sufficient extent by actions taken under the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970,72 the Atomic Energy Act of
1954,73 or the Clean Air Act.7 4
B. Relation of the Act to Presently Existing Federal Regulations
Section 3 of the Act defines consumer product to be
any article, or component part thereof, produced or distributed(i) for sale to a consumer for use in or around a permanent or
temporary household or residence, a school, in recreation, or other-
wise, or (ii) for the personal use, consumption or enjoyment of a
consumer in or around a permanent or temporary household or
residence, a school, in recreation, or otherwise ....
A wide variety of products are specifically excluded from the def-
inition, products which logically should be included in order to
fully achieve the purposes of the Act.75 These product categories
are (1) those which are not customarily produced or distributed
to the consumer, (2) tobacco and tobacco products, (3) motor ve-
hicles and equipment, (4) economic poisons, (5) firearms and am-
munition, (6) aircraft and associated equipment, (7) boats and
69. 15 U.S.C. § 1191 et seq. (1970).
70. See. 30(a), (b).
71. Sec. 30 (d). See Appendix II infra.
72. 29 U.S.C. § 651 etseq. (1970).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. (1970).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 et seq. (1970).
75. See note 8 supra.
equipment, (8) drugs, devices and cosmetics, and (9) food.76
With two exceptions, these products were excluded because it was
felt that they were adequately regulated by regulations already
in existence.7 7 The two categories of products which were not ex-
cluded from the definition of consumer product using this ration-
ale are tobacco and firearms. Appendix I shows the types of regu-
latory measures employed by the Act and compares them to the pro-
visions of the regulations governing those products not con-
tained in the definition of consumer product.78
For the most part, federal safety legislation consists of piece-
meal responses to specific safety crises and too often fails to include
closely associated product hazards. 9 Also, these federal regula-
tory procedures are often inadequate. For example, the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 80 regulates mainly
through the requirement of labeling of hazards and does not con-
fer general authority to promulgate performance standards.8 ' This
is a typical example of the inflexibility of regulations and serves
to accentuate what is perhaps the most significant difference be-
tween this Act and the regulations governing the excluded prod-
ucts. Depending on the hazard to be eliminated, the Commission
can elect any of several methods including formulating standards,
requiring the labeling of hazards, requiring the recall of products,
banning products, and imposing civil and criminal penalties.
C. Relation of the Act to Previously Existing Remedies
Before the Act, federal legislation in the areas of product safety
was virtually non-existent, consisting in the main of isolated reg-
ulations enacted to deal with specific hazards. Moreover, no gov-
ernment agency was empowered to ban products which posed un-
reasonable risks of injury, or to require compliance with minimum
safety standards. 82  Neither were there any procedures by which
manufacturers could be enjoined from marketing unreasonably
hazardous products. No meaningful criminal penalties existed for
manufacturers who knowingly marketed unreasonably dangerous
goods. 83
76. Sec. 3 (a) (1) (A-I).
77. House Report at 27-28.
78. The consequences of and rationale for the congressional failure to
consolidate all consumer protection functions in a single agency is dis-
cussed at p. 837 infra.
79. NCPS at 89.
80. 7 U.S.C. § 135 (a-k) (1970).
81. NCPS at 92.
82. Id. at 2.
83. Id. -
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Equally inadequate as a protection for the consumer is industry
self-regulation. The legal unenforceability of any standards or
regulations is the most obvious drawback to consumer protection.
Furthermore, competition between manufacturers tends to result
in a subordination of safety factors to cost considerations, styling
and other marketing considerations.8 4 One authority describes the
inadequacy of industry self-regulation thusly:
As now constituted, industry codes have a built-in weakness, for
they are prepared and controlled on a voluntary basis by the very
people to whom they are to be applied; the analogy would be if thejudge and judged were the same. All of man's experience shows
that self policing does not give the public adequate protection.8 5
State and local laws were also examined and found inadequate
in the study by the National Commission on Product Safety. Their
study revealed a "hodgepodge of tragedy-inspired responses to
challenges that cannot be met by restricted geographical enti-
ties."80 It was also found that the laws were doubly burdensome
in that they were ineffective from a safety aspect while at the same
time being unduly restrictive on manufacturing. The National
Commission on Product Safety summarized that
[w]ithout central leadership, States and municipalities are unable
to chart broad spectrum product safety programs. Balkanized jur-
isdiction plagues some manufacturers with diverse manufactur-
ing specifications that interfere with distribution of their product.87
Before the Act, then, the consumer was left to forage for reme-
dies among the common law of products liability, particularly in
the areas of warranty, negligence (and intentional tort) and strict
liability. Regardless of the theory, there are certain issues present
in every products liability case. In order to recover from the man-
ufacturer or seller of a product alleged to have caused injury, it
should be remembered that the consumer must show that
(1) the product in question.., has been defective or harmful in
some way, that is, to have had an element capable of causing in-jury; (2) the party sought to be held liable for the injury is identi-
fied with the product (that is, is shown to have actually been or
to have had the status of, its manufacturer or seller); and (3) the
defendant manufacturer's or seller's act or omission with respect to
his product must be shown to be causally related to the harm for
84. Id.
85. Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover (Ret.), NCPS at introduction to
Part ElI.
86. Id. at 2.
87. Id. at 3.
which it is sought to hold him liable 8S
1. Warranty
The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) imputes two implied
warranties onto the vendor of goods that goods shall be merchant-
able89 and that they shall be fit for a particular purpose.00 Also
recognized is the creation of express warranties when the seller
makes any affirmation of fact or when there is any description of
the goods which becomes a basis for the bargain.91
Two serious drawbacks exist in the use of this remedy by the
consumer; that of lack of privity of contract between the consumer
and manufacturer, and that of the opportunity of a manufacturer
to disclaim any of the warranties. Though the relaxed rigidity
of these principles has made them chiefly of historical interest, the
unwary consumer could still fall prey to these defenses.
The question of privity was based on the idea that since the
contract was made between X and Y, X alone could sue only Y if
there were a breach of an implied or express warranty. This doc-
trine was believed to be unduly restrictive and was finally ex-
ploded in the famous case of Henningsem v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc.,92 which held both the manufacturer of an auto and the dealer
who sold it liable to the wife of the purchaser who was driving the
car on a theory of an implied warranty of safety.
Problems still exist in this area. Since the cause of action sounds
in contract, many courts and attorneys still apply contract rules
which simply cannot be complied with because in most cases no
contract exists between the parties.98
The requirement that the consumer give timely notice to the
manufacturer after discovery of the breach 4 and the availability
of warranty disclaimers95 are further albatrosses around the neck
of the consumer. As to the U.C.C.'s requirement of timely notice,
the courts were aware of the inequity of holding a consumer to the
88. 1 R. KuRsH, AIVtEIcAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABIITY 3, § 1:1 (1961).
89. UNIFORM COMM ERCIAL CODE § 2-314.
90. UNIFORM COMnERcIAL CODE § 2-315.
91. UNIFORM Com~nCIAm= CODE § 2-313(1).
92. 32 N.J. 359, 161 A.2d 691 (1960). This decision was the logical
terminus of the line of cases which used various fictions such as the
agency of the dealer to sell for the manufacturer, or the consumer's being
the third party beneficiary of a contract between the manufacturer and
the retailer. See W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 654 n.27 (4th
ed. 1971) (PRossER), citing an article which lists 29 such methods by
which various courts have achieved this result.
93. PROSSER at 655.
94. UNIroRw Coi MERIAL CODE § 2-607.
95. UNIFoRM CommnvacIAL CODE § 2-316.
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same level of knowledge as a dealer in goods and deftly avoided
this problem by holding that a long delay was reasonable, or that
the provision was not intended to apply in personal injury cases, or
by holding that the requirement was inapplicable where the parties
had not dealt with each other.9 6
Courts and legislatures also frown on disclaimers of liability and
have effectively relegated them to a role of relatively secondary sig-
nificance in products liability cases.9 7 Courts have been imposing
liability in the face of these disclaimers on various rationales since
as far back as 1907.98 In California tight restrictions on the efficacy
of disclaimers have been imposed by statute, restrictions so tight
that it is likely that most consumers would be irate if the disclo-
sure required to make the disclaimer efficacious were actually
made known to them.99
Thus the consumer is left to prove the following elements in a
cause of action under a warranty theory: he must prove that
there was a breach of the express or implied warranty, a causal
connection between the breach and the injury, and damages. Once
these elements are proved, the seller or manufacturer is strictly
liable even though he was not negligent in manufacturing or
marketing the defective good. Although there is good authority to
the contrary,100 it is felt that in a given fact situation, a consumer
could recover under this theory. Furthermore, it is good practice
to plead this theory along with other common law causes of ac-
tion because of the inapplicability of the usual tort defenses of con-
96. PROSSER at 655-56.
97. Although few manufacturers would strenuously pursue a disclaimer
defense where the disclaimer is, for want of a better phrase, "against pub-
lic policy", it is postulated that the mere existence of these provisions in
the contract could induce an injured consumer who has not sought legal
advice to never bring suit.
98. See Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1131-
32 (1960).
99. See Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1790 et
seq. (West 1973), particularly § 1792.4. But see Delta Airlines Inc. v.
Douglas Aircraft, 238 Cal. App. 2d 95, 47 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1965) where
waiver of all conditions or liabilities by seller was held valid when the case
involved no element of personal injury, privity of contract issue, or ele-
ments of inequality of bargaining position, or adhesion contract. There is
no thwarting of public policy through recognition of disclaimers in the
commercial world where the buyer may be able to absorb and administer
the inevitable risk of seller's operation. See Comment, Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Legislation, 29 Onto ST. L.J. 177, 206 n.190 (1968).
100. See, e.g., PROSSER at 656.
tributory negligence and assumption of risk in a contract action.
2. Negligence or Intentional Misconduct
A manufacturer who knows or has reason to know that his prod-
uct is defective or dangerous and nonetheless injects it into the
stream of commerce without warning may be liable for the in-
tentional tort of battery if injury were substantially certain to re-
sult from the use of the product.101
Negligence differs from intentional tort in products liability in
that there is a lower degree of knowledge evident on the part of the
defendant in the negligence case. In the landmark case of Mac-
Pherson v. Buick Motor Company,10 2 Justice Cardozo found that
the manufacturer assumed a duty to the consumer regarding prod-
ucts which would be dangerous if negligently made; merely by plac-
ing the vehicle on the market. The rule has been extended beyond
inherently dangerous articles and has finally emerged to hold the
seller liable for negligence for marketing any product which could
foreseeably be expected to inflict substantial harm if it is defec-
tive.103 This liability runs to anyone in the marketing chain in-
cluding component part manufacturers and assemblers,10 4 and in-
ures to the benefit of any foreseeable plaintiff. 05
The failure of the manufacturer to exercise the care of a reason-
ably prudent man under the circumstances shows his negligence,
and this care is required in every aspect of his marketing activity,
ranging from a failure to inspect or test to failure to disclose de-
fects and dangers. While the negligence cause of action is still of
importance when the liability is based on a design defect, or failure
to give an adequate warning, 06 the existence of the usual defenses
to negligence, i.e., contributory negligence and assumption of risk,
have relegated this cause of action to the status of "a second string
101. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrill Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
This was the first of the famous MER/29 cases. MER/29, an anti-cholestrol
drug, was known by the defendants to be substantially certain to cause
cataracts. The defendants marketed the drug nonetheless, and even went
so far as to falsify their report to the government. Though the opinion is
phrased in terms of negligence, it appears that the requisite degree of
knowledge was before the court such that the tort of battery could have
been established.
Even if a cause of action for intentional tort probably cannot be estab-
lished because of the difficulty of proving the requisite degree of knowl-
edge, it should still be asserted since it might affect the issue of punitive
damages.
102. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1060 (1916).
103. PRossEa at 643 (citing cases).
104. Id. at 664.
105. Id. at 662.
106. Id. at 644-46.
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to the bow."'1
0 7
3. Strict Liability in Tort
The concept of strict liability in tort stems from a 1963 Califor-
nia decision, Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 10 8 and was re-em-
phasized in another recent California case, Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson
Corp.10 In Cronin the California Supreme Court discussed the split
of authority in the definition of defect, some courts following the
standard expressed in Greenman, but the majority following the
standard as expressed in Section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts." 0 The Greenman rule, followed in California, is as fol-
lows:
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places
on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for
defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human be-
ing.... [T]he liability is not governed by the law of contract
warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort."'
The majority rule in this country according to the Cronin court is
the rule of Section 402A, which requires for recovery that the plain-
tiff show not merely a defective product as in Greenman, but a
product in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous.""12
The significance of the different rules goes to the proof require-
ment on the part of the plaintiff. Under Section 402A the added
burden is that the defective condition, i.e., a condition not contem-
plated by the ultimate consumer, must be unreasonably danger-
ous.1 13 Unreasonably dangerous was defined as being "danger-
107. Id. at 644 n.39.
108. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963).
109. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 501 P.2d 1153 (1972).
110. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A (1965):
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreason-
ably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is sub-ject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate
user or consumer, or to his property, if(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
(emphasis added).
111. 59 Cal. 2d at 62-63, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700-01, 377 P.2d at 900-01.
112. 8 Cal. 3d at 130-31, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 440-41, 501 P.2d at 1160-61.
113. RESTATELIENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402A (1965) comment g at 351.
ous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by
the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowl-
edge common to the community as to its characterisitics."'1 4
The result of this added burden is to require the plaintiff to
prove "an element which rings of negligence." 11  This result is
antithetical to the purpose of the doctrine of strict liability, viz., to
relieve the plaintiff from the problems of proof inherent in negli-
gence or warranty actions, and thereby to insure that the costs of
injuries from defective products are borne by the manufactur-
ers.116
Whatever burden is imposed on the plaintiff as to proving the
product defective and/or unreasonably dangerous, 117 he must also
prove that the defect proximately caused the alleged harm. He need
not prove that he was unaware of the defect,118 since this is an af-
firmative defense (awareness of the defect implies an assumption
of risk) which must be pleaded and proved by the defendant.
Compared to the common law remedies, the standard employed
in the Act for assertion of a private cause of action most nearly ap-
proaches negligence or intentional tort in its scope. Section 23 of
the Act restricts suit to those consumers who sustain injury by rea-
son of a "knowing" or willful violation of a consumer product safety
rule. As previously mentioned, "knowing" is further defined by
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) comment i at 352-53.
115. 8 Cal. 3d at 132, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442, 501 P.2d at 1162.
The "negligence" aspect, therefore, requires that the plaintiff show that
there was some degree of foreseeability of injury from the use of the
product. To prove a cause of action in a court following Greenman, the
plaintiff need only show that the product was defective. It is difficult to
conceive of a product's being shown to be defective without some showing
of foreseeability of injury. For example, a chair may be defective and
unreasonably dangerous if it cannot support a 200 pound man. But is a
chair defective because it cannot sustain a 500 pound man? In such a
case, the element of foreseeability, which "rings of negligence," must be
considered even by a Greenman court, in much the same manner as a
Restatement court would.
116. Id.
117. Whatever the burden on the plaintiff as to what he must prove in
order to establish the defect, it has been postulated that recoverable prod-
uct defects can be grouped into six categories:
(1) The product must be one that is unreasonably dangerous,(2) It involves unexpected danger,(3) It bears inadequate warning concerning dangers from proper
use,
(4) It has a defect that is not natural to the product,
(5) It produces a reaction which is not an isolated occurrence,
or(6) The product creates an ultra-hazardous condition.
Freedman, "Defect" in the Product: The Necessary Basis for Products
Liability in Tort and Warranty, 33 TENN. L. REv. 323 (1966).
118. Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal 3d 136, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443, 501 P.2d 1163
(1972).
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Section 20 (c) as meaning
(1) the having of actual knowledge, or (2) the presumed having of
knowledge deemed to be possessed by a reasonable man who acts
in the circumstances, including knowledge obtainable upon the ex-
ercise of due care to ascertain the truth of representations.
Since a knowing violation of a safety rule will subject a manufac-
turer or seller to criminal liability,' 19 a discussion of the relation
of penal statute violations and negligence is appropriate.
Briefly, statutory violation in a negligence case is usually shown
as either negligence per se, or as merely "some evidence" of neg-
ligence.12 0 Negligence per se proceeds under the theory that the
legislature, as representatives of the community, can promulgate
statutes which substitute a minimum standard of care for the jury's
determination of the standard, the violation of which is negli-
gence. 121 The opposite view is that since penal statutes are to be
strictly construed, and that no penal statute if so construed
contains any implications that it is to be applicable in private liti-
gation, then violation of a statute should have no bearing on civil
liability for negligence. 2 2 The fact that there is a statutory viola-
tion should only be "some evidence" for a jury to consider in decid-
ing whether the violator was negligent.
2 3
The legislative preemption of the jury's function in the negli-
gence per se theory stems from a determination that in certain fact
119. Sec. 21.
120. See Comment, Products Liability Based Upon Violation of Statutory
Standards, 64 MInch. L. REV. 1388, 1390-93 (1966).
121. Id. at 1390.
122. Id. at 1392, citing Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal
Legislation, 16 MINN. L. REV. 361, 369-70 (1932).
123. Comment, supra note 119, at 1392; Lowndes at 369-70. See also
Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School District, 29 Cal. 2d 581, 177 P.2d 279
(1947) (violation of statute raising a rebuttable presumption of negligence);
New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Novick Transfer Co., 274 F.2d 916 (4th
Cir. 1960) (violation of statute only "some evidence" of negligence, apply-
ing Maryland law).
An alternative to these theories is that proof of a statutory violation is
prima facie evidence of negligence, with the jury to decide whether the
manufacturer, retailer, or distributor is to bear the primary responsibility
for the particular product defect.
It was noted that this theory is used only where the statute did not
require a showing of a violator's mens rea. Furthermore, it is indicated
that since this theory's main purpose is to avoid subjecting a violator to
liability via the negligence per se route when someone else in the market-
ing chain was more "at fault", the concept is made unnecessary by the
tendency of most courts to broadly interpret their jurisdiction's indemnifi-
situations, a given standard of care is necessary to achieve some
purpose that the legislature had in mind when it promulgated the
statute. To insure that the negligence per se findings comport with
the legislative purpose, the plaintiff must fall within four restric-
tions:
(1) He must belong to the class of persons whose interests were
sought to be protected by the legislation upon which he relies; (2)
* * * the particular interest invaded by a defendant's alleged mis-
conduct was of the type which the legislature sought to safe-
guard; (3) ... the enactment was intended to protect this inter-
est from the particular hazard which caused the injury giving
rise to the litigation; and (4) ... the statute was designed to guard
against the kind of harm exemplified by this injury.124
As previously noted,'125 the key to consumer recovery is show-
ing a knowledgeable violation of a consumer safety rule. If a con-
sumer can allege this knowledge, then he has raised a federal ques-
tion, and can bring suit in federal courts.126 While the Act serves
to establish "statutory" negligence, or negligence per se, the con-
sumer need not jettison the more easily proven cause of action of
strict liability in tort, because under the doctrine of pendent jur-
isdiction, the consumer can assert any state causes of action (i.e.,
the common law causes of action) as long as these claims have
arisen from a common nucleus of operative facts.127 Since previous
experience under the common law has indicated a willingness on
the part of courts to widely apply these causes of action, the signi-
cation statutes, so that the most culpable party will not escape liability.
Comment, supra note 119, at 1392-93.
124. Comment, supra note 119, at 1395, citing RESTATEMIENT (SECOND) or
TORTS § 286 (1965).
125. See p. 820-22 supra.
126. Sec. 23 expressly provides that an injured consumer can bring suit
in federal court providing he meets the $10,000 requirement of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1970).
Depending on the facts of each case, this option for a federal over a
state court may be advantageous. The familiar phrase "procedural ad-
vantages of suing in federal courts" has been rendered somewhat less mean-
ingful, however, since 28 jurisdictions have adopted the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure or some close approximation of them. See 1 W. BARRON
& A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRAcTICE AND PROCEDURE § 9-9.53 (C. Wright ed.
1960, Supp. 1969). Moreover, all states have to some extent been influ-
enced by the federal rules. See C. WRIGHT, HANDBoox OF THE LAW Or FED-
ERAL. COURTS § 62 at 260 (2d ed. 1970). It is true that the federal rules
of procedure are broader than some state rules for a plaintiff in the
areas of pleading, discovery, service of process (especially in statutory
interpleader actions) and subpoena powers.
127. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
The possibility of pendent jurisdiction may have been overlooked by
Congress. In discussing the courses of action open to a consumer, it was
noted that
it is also very possible for a manufacturer to do everything in
his power to turn out a proper item and not do so. The design
may be good and the manufacturing process well set up and
supervised, and yet a lone defective product can result. If a de-
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ficance of the Act with respect to private actions for injury is that
the consumer now has an additional forum in which to bring
suit.
PART 1--CRmQuE OF THE ACT
The fashion of the times is to look askance at any semi-paternal-
istic128 governmental activities which are intended to protect the
consumer from "big businessmen". Whether or not such skepticism
is warranted, it appears to be unfounded in looking at this Act.
On balance the favorable aspects outweigh the deficiencies-while
the Act does not completely subordinate the manufacturer's interests
to those of the consumer, it does impose certain burdens on him,
and given the need for some sort of legislation in this area,'1 29 the
Act should prove helpful. Moreover, it arms the consumer with
certain alternatives not found at the common law.
Several valid arguments against the establishment of the new
agency exist. First, the establishment of another agency will prob-
ably be unjustifiable in that the gains to the consumer will be in-
significant when compared to the costs to the government. Consid-
ering the poor track records of certain agencies, the Interstate Com-
merce Commission and the Food and Drug Administration in parti-
cular, 30 this generalization is not completely irrational. Moreover,
fendant business can successfully show that all these things ob-
tained, it will be considered a defense against losses by reason of
product failure.
118 Cong. Rec. H8567 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1972) (remarks of Rep. Springer).
The fact situation discussed by Representative Springer would obviously
yield a good defense to the "knowing" requirement of Sec. 23. But this
same fact situation would nonetheless produce liability in a strict liability
in tort cause of action, which may be adjudicated in the federal courts
under pendent jurisdiction.
128. There is no product, no matter how inherently safe it is, that cannot
be turned into an engine of destruction in the hands of an imaginative,
but clumsy, consumer. Only a complete conversion to full governmental
paternalism can produce the millenium, which was perhaps the goal of
Congress, because only when there is legislation eliminating all products
which could harm a consumer due to even unforeseeable misuse will user
stupidity exit as a cause of injury. Obviously this complete govern-
mental control is not forthcoming. Since this and other consumer legisla-
tion only extends to products which would be dangerous if defective, or
which are inherently dangerous, or which would be dangerous when
"foreseeably misused", it can only be termed "semi-paternalistic".
129. See notes 2, 8 supra.
130. See 118 CONG. REc. H8571 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1972) (remarks of
Rep. Broyhill) for a brief discussion of F.D.A. ineptitude. A critic of the
since the functions of the new Agency are for the most part already
being performed by other agencies,131 another agency is unneces-
sary. A redirection of policy or re-ordering of priorities among
already existing governmental bodies would adequately protect the
consumer, using legislation already in existence.13 2
It cannot be disputed that creating a new agency instead of uti-
lizing presently existing bodies will be costly. But it is also be-
yond dispute that the system for protection prior to the Act was
insufficient.133 A new, independent agency is desirable for two
reasons. First, the National Commission on Product Safety and
Congress concluded that the new Commission should be kept as in-
sulated as possible from the influence of politics-a conclusion
which precluded placing the agency within the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare as desired by President Nixon and
then Secretary of H.E.W. Richardson. 34 Moreover, the existing
legislation which assertedly could be used instead of the Act was
designed to meet other problems not directly related to consumer
product safety. For example, the Federal Trade Commission was in-
tended at least in part to prohibit deceptive advertising, not to
prohibit the marketing of unsafe products."3 5
A second argument directs itself to the rationale behind allowing
public participation in Commission activities. The Act established
a Commission which decides whether standards and rules are nec-
essary for consumer protection. The Commission determines the
public interest in safety and weighs it against the interest of the
I.C.C. accurately concludes "[t]he ICC is in the most literal sense an
organization that does not know what it is doing .... " G. HILTON, THE
TRANSPORTATION ACT OF 1958-A DECADE OF EXPERIENCE 189 (1969).
131. For a brief discussion of the duplication of consumer protection
functions under various agencies, see S. REP. No. 92-835, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1972) reprinted in UNITED STATES CODE CONGRESSIONAL AND ADMIN-
ISTRATIV NEWS 4575-78, 4589-93 (1972).
132. It is conceivable that the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 41 et seq. (1970), could be extended to apply to unreasonably dangerous
consumer products. This act prohibits deceptive trade practices; it might
be argued that marketing an unreasonably dangerous product and leading
the consumer to believe that the product is not dangerous (when the con-
sumer would not have purchased the product had its defect been known
to him) is a deceptive trade practice. It should be remembered that the
F.T.C. is basically concerned with maintaining fair and free competition,
and not with product safety per se.
133. See text accompanying notes 79-81 supra.
134. Compare House Report at 29-30 and NCPS at 114, with Letter from
Elliot L. Richardson to Harley 0. Staggers, March 1, 1972, in House Report
at 54, and Letter from Richard M. Nixon to Harley 0. Staggers, Dec. 8,
1971, in House Report at 60 (both letters referring to legislation which
would have structured the new Agency within H.E.W.).
135. See note 131 supra. Cf. the federal Flammable Fabrics Act 15
U.S.C. § 1191-1204 (1970) where violations are treated as deceptive trade
practices.
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manufacturer in profit-making. Why, then, allow yet another pri-
vate interest, that of a consumer in airing a pet peeve against a
product, to enter the picture at all? Allowing judicially backed
petitions for agency action implies that the Commission determina-
tion of the public interest exists in name only. Granting the con-
sumer access to the court will mean that much of the Commission's
efforts will be spent in justifying its actions, instead of eliminating
product safety hazards.
However, the Act's greatest strong point is its accessibility to
both the consumer and manufacturer alike.1 36 Notwithstanding the
Commission's own standard-making and enforcement powers, the
consumer has the opportunity to petition the Commission to be-
gin the proceedings for the issuance of a safety rule,137 to bring a
court action to enforce a consumer product safety rule or recall
order, 38 or to bring a court action to recover damages. 139 Unlike
other federal agencies, then, consumer input is encouraged by the
provisions of the Act, input to which the Commission must re-
spond.140 Conversely, the manufacturer can petition the Commis-
sion to bring proceedings to terminate a standard.1 41 Moreover,
all parties may obtain judicial review of Commission actions adverse
to their interests. 42 Given the intense need for adequate con-
136. The second argument, discussed at p. 834, decries consumer
input in the establishment or enforcement of standards and rules as
an usurpation of the authority duly delegated to the Commission. Why
raise this brouhaha? If the object of the Act is to achieve the goals
set by Congress, see note 8 and accompanying text supra, what dif-
ference does it make -who initiates or forces the action if the goal is
reached?
If the goal is not achieved, that is, if the consumer action is held to be
unfounded or spiteful, then of course the Commission has wasted re-
sources in defending the action. However, given the enormity of the
problem created by hazardous products, see note 2 supra, this feature of
the Act seems justified when balanced against costs. For the role of pri-




140. Sec. 10. The House Report at 38 points out that the right to peti-
tion agency action is a part of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(e) (1970), which governs these proceedings. Also, Sec. 10 adds the re-
quirement that the Commission must explain its reasons for denying a
petition. While this is standard administrative law practice, it still pro-
vides the consumer his first actual voice as a consumer.
141. Section 10.
142. Sections 10 and 11 provide for judicial review of action taken by the
sumer protection, the opportunity for manufacturers to protest
Commission rulings exemplifies the Congressional attempt to main-
tain fairness to the manufacturers. The procedures for manu-
facturer protest appear to be adequate to maintain the particular
interests of the production sector.
As previously mentioned it was deemed desirable to keep the
new Agency as free as possible from the influences of politicians.
The class of people known as politicans would corrupt the admin-
istrators of the Act in an attempt to protect special interests. It
should be noted that this argument for the creation of an inde-
pendent agency is somewhat weak. Since Senators and Repre-
sentatives are popularly elected, by definition they represent the
will of the people, and therefore any influence they exert will be
that of the people. Whether the influence is manifested by surrep-
titious back-room deals, by budget cutbacks, or some other method,
the result is still the same-a representative of the people doing the
will of the people. Furthermore, agency independence really has
little bearing on whether the Commission will be overly susceptible
to suggestions made by congressmen, because any pressure which
might be exerted via party machinery could as easily be exerted
by personal contact or by way of the budget. Therefore it appears
that the very physical location of the office, Washington D.C., op-
erates to make less significant the fact that the Agency is indepen-
dent of the Executive department.
The Act balances two competing interests in the area of disclo-
sure of relevant information. It cannot be gainsaid that the con-
sumer has a pressing interest in learning about product defects.
Similarly, a manufacturer has such an interest in desiring to keep
to a minimum derogatory information about his product. The pro-
cedure in the Act will allow for this disclosure to the public only
after giving the manufacturer 30 days notice in which time the
manufacturer may comment to the Commission on the content of
the disclosure, either by explanation or by use of additional in-
formation. There is no requirement that the Commission include
the manufacturer's information in the same release.143 While this
procedure is fair to both sides, it should be noted that there is no
mandatory requirement that such product related information be
disclosed.144 During the 30 day moratorium on disclosure, a man-
Commission regarding petitions for issuing, revoking, or altering stand-
ards, and regarding the promulgation of standards.
143. Sec. 6. Also provided for in this section is the retraction of errone-
ous or misleading releases, and for a less than 30 day waiting period
should the product defect require a faster release.
Trade secrets, patents and the like are shielded from disclosure.
144. Section 25 (c) requires that accident or investigation reports be made
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ufacturer may, instead of explaining, take some other actions, such
as removing the defect from the product, or giving notice of the de-
fect himself. It could be said that such actions accomplish a pur-
pose of the Act, viz., to protect the consumer from unreasonable risk
of injury, or to aid the consumer in evaluating the comparative
safety of consumer products. 145 The Commission should nonethe-
less voluntarily make the disclosure, for any of several reasons. For
instance, the manufacturer cannot be expected to be as objective
or complete in voluntary disclosure or repair; the consumer has
a right, or at least an intense interest, in knowing which manufac-
turers are being scrutinized by the Commission in order to be
more vigilant in other dealings with the manufacturer; the con-
sumer may be totally unaware that certain products he thought
fool-proof can in fact be unreasonably dangerous; or for the more
selfish reason that the Commission should be active in the public
eye. Lack of a statutory requirement of disclosure will doubtless
result in a lesser amount of information being disseminated. It
is asserted that it is the exception rather than the rule that the
consumer would be benefited in any significant sense by receiving
anything less than full disclosure of product defects.
The two largest drawbacks to the Act, which threaten to reduce
the Act's virility to that of a mule, are its failure to consolidate
all consumer protection functions in a single agency, and the asso-
ciated failure to provide for the regulation of al consumer prod-
ucts in the Act. The Senate proposed that the inspections divi-
sions of the Department of Agriculture be transferred to the new
consumer protection agency, because it "has so poorly performed
its duties in connection with meat, and poultry inspection that the
situation has become a national disgrace.' 14 6 The Senate also sug-
gested that the duties of the Secretary of H.E.W. administered un-
available to the public, and that reports on research projects, demonstra-
tion projects and the like shall be public information.
This section implies that the information will be disclosed if a consumer
requests it, i.e., it will not be denied to the consumer. "Not being denied
access" is a far cry from a mandatory disclosure requirement.
145. Sec. 2 (b) (1), (2).
146. 118 CoNG. REc. S9885 (daily ed. June 21, 1972) (remarks of Sen.
Ribicoff).
This charge was responded to with the retort: "There is nowhere in the
world where consumers are getting purer food than in the United States
.... " Id. (remarks of Sen. Young). For four reports substantiating
Sen. Ribicoff's charges, see Reports on the Food Inspection Programs of
the Department of Agriculure, id. at S9884-87.
der the Food and Drug Administration be transferred to the new
agency, because the F.D.A. was, at best, inept:
the [F.D.A.] requires elementary restructuring in the public inter-
est. Stripping it of much of its consumer protection functions and
reposing them in a separate consumer protection agency seem to
be the only reasonable solution.147
The House rejected these proposals and the final shape of the Act
did nothing "to upgrade the quality of Government regulation of
foods and drugs.1148
Logic dictates that if a need for consumer protection exists, and
that if the method selected to fill this need has been ineffective or
worse, then some other method should be substituted. It is no argu-
ment to say that although the first 60 years of regulation were in-
effective, the past few months show that the F.D.A. has begun to
function more effectively than ever.149 It is postulated that even if
the alternative to past ineptitude is a new untested agency, it would
be unreasonable not to at least attempt progress.
Laying aside the failure of Congress to fully consolidate con-
sumer protection functions, obviously cutting costs involved in
duplication of efforts, the second major drawback to the effective-
ness of the Act merits discussion. Congress responded to an obvious
national problem, if not an emergency, in passing this legislation.
The Act broadly defines consumer products, then stringently reg-
ulates them, while allowing wide latitude to interested parties to
interject their own ideas. In this regard, this legislation offers the
most comprehensive and fair alternatives to all concerned. It can-
not be disputed that no other existing safety regulations are
more far-reaching in their scope.150 Yet why did Congress apply
such stringent regulations on articles defined as consumer prod-
ucts' 51 and allow the excluded products to be either unregulated or
regulated by already existing and less consumer oriented legis-
lation?
It is difficult to suggest a rational explanation why Congress
chose to exclude the broad spectrum of goods regulated elsewhere,
especially in view of the fact that the National Commission on
Product Safety so cogently indicated the need for more compre-
hensive and flexible legislation which Congress accepted without
147. Id. at S9896 (remarks of Sen. Montoya).
148. 118 CONG. REc. S18198 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1972) (remarks of Sen.
Moss).
149. 118 CONG. R~c. S9892 (daily ed. June 21, 1972) (remarks of Sen.
Cotton).
150. See Appendix I.
151. See p.15 supra for the definition of "consumer product".
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question in other areas.152
As to tobacco and firearms, there is no logical explanation why
these products are unregulated. 153 The familiar reports of the Sur-
geon General have had virtually no effect on Congress, save for the
television cigarette advertising ban. 5 4 The blatant admission that
Congress has yet to determine that tobacco should be subjected to
safety regulations as envisioned in the Act' 55 belies congressional
ignorance.156 Yet what evidence would Congress require before
initiating any performance-related consumer product safety stand-
ards? Surely the numerous cases where consumers sought recov-
ery for damages due to unsafe products' 57 cannot have eluded
congressional scrutiny.
Given the current trend of the judiciary toward extending more
and more protection to the consumer, in all likelihood these prod-
ucts will one day be regulated by statute. Future analysis will
undoubtedly fail to disclose the reasons behind the congressional
reluctance to enact these regulations when the chance presented it-
self.
MIcHAEL T. Fox
152. See NCPS at 114.
153. Unregulated here does not mean the absence of regulation. There
is certainly no dearth of regulations of these product types, but one will
search in vain for any regulations relative to safety requirements, or, as the
Act requires in Sec. 7(a) (1), and (2), any requirements as to performance,
composition, contents and design, construction, finish, or packaging, or any
requirements as to markings of warnings or instructions.
154. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1970) (Public Health Cigarette Smoking
Act).
155. House Report at 27. The safety standards envisioned are not of the
sort which would be enacted because tobacco consumption is "bad" or
because the government knows what is best for the consumer in this area.
Rather than protecting the consumer from lung cancer, safety regulations
which should have been included under the Act would protect the consumer
from hazards such as exploding cigarettes, or cigarettes containing razor
blades. See authorities cited in note 156 infra.
156. See, e.g., 118 CONG. REc. H8568 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1972) where Rep.
Springer blithely says "[tjobacco is covered in [the] FDA. . . ." but cites
no authority in support.
157. See 4 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTs LiABIny, TC-23 to -24,
TC-154 to -156 (1965) (firearms and ammunition); id. at TC-269 to -270
(tobacco); 2 R. KuasH, AMRicAN LAW OF PRODUCTs LIABHLITY 479-92 (1961)
61-64 (Supp. 1972) (tobacco products); 3 R. KuRSH, AxMRcAN LAW OF
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Appendix H
Section 30 of the Act transfers to the Commission the responsi-
bility of administering the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, The
Poison Prevention Packaging Act of 1970, the Flammable Fabrics
Act and the regulations dealing with refrigerator safety. Section
30 of the Act, which transfers these functions, has a Proviso that
Commission regulation of products governed by these enactments
must be in accordance with the provisions of those acts. Addition-
ally, the Commission is restrained from regulating consumer pro-
duct safety hazards if the risks could be eliminated under the Oc-
cupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, or the Clean Air Act. The content of these regulations is
briefly examined in the following chart.
The immediate realization after an examination of the chart is
that the conclusion of the National Commission on Product Safety
was correct in its assessment of the state of federal consumer pro-
duct safety regulation before the Act, i.e., that the regulations were
too inflexible and limited. See p. 16, supra.
(Footnotes to following table)
1. Violations are deemed a deceptive practice under the Federal Trade
Commission Act.
2. The standards and definitions are very technical. See also § 1261.
3. This section refers to review of toy safety standards only.
4. Private cause of action allowed, see Sherman v. M. Lowenstein &
Sons, Inc., 282 N.Y.S.2d 142, 28 App. Div. 2d 922 (1967).
5. Private cause of action allowed, see Courtney v. American Oil Co.,
220 So. 2d 675 (Fla. App. 1968).
6. No case law here yet, but in view of what is required to be found
by the Commission before it promulgates any standards (set forth in §
1472(b)), it seems likely that violation of a standard here would clearly
mean that the violator had acted negligently.
7. No express provision allowing private actions, but several sections
are statutory limitations on liability, implying a contemplation of litiga-
tion.
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